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1. Introduction 
Standard macroeconomic models developed before the current financial crisis abstracted 
from banks and other financial intermediaries. The current financial crisis has revealed 
the limitations of this class of models. The crisis was triggered by credit losses in the US 
mortgage market. These credit losses lowered the capital of US and foreign banks active 
in the US market, thus leading to an increase in the credit spreads, and a persistent fall in 
real activity world-wide. This paper presents a DSGE model with banks that accounts for 
these phenomena.   
 I consider a closed economy, before analyzing a two-country world. There are 
three (representative) agents: (i) a household that works and invests her savings in bank 
deposits; (ii) a banker who lends to an entrepreneur; (iii) the entrepreneur accumulates 
capital and produces a final good (using capital and labor). Deposits provide liquidity 
services to the household. The bank faces a regulatory capital requirement, and thus 
partially finance loans using own funds (equity). Hence, the loan rate exceeds the  deposit 
rate. The interest spread is a decreasing function of the bank’s ‘excess’ capital (i.e. of 
bank capital held in excess of the mandatory level).  
 In the structure here, an unanticipated credit loss lowers the bank’s capital, and 
raises the loan/deposit rate spread. Essentially, an unanticipated fall in the bank’s wealth 
worsens the financial friction, which leads to a fall in investment, employment and 
output.  In calibrated model versions, the deposit rate falls, in response to the credit loss, 
and household consumption rises; this raises the wage, and triggers a fall in employment 
and output, and a fall in investment. By contrast, in a model variant in which households 
directly lend to entrepreneurs (without using financial intermediaries), a credit loss has 
(virtually) no effect on the loan rate, and output and investment change much less. 
Numerical simulations suggest that the magnification of the real effects of credit losses, 
due to financial intermediation, can be sizable.  
 However, financial intermediation dampens the response of output and investment 
to productivity (TFP) shocks. A positive TFP shock raises household income, and thus 
the household holds more deposits, i.e. the bank’s excess capital falls. This triggers a 
widening of the loan/deposits interest rate spread, which dampens the expansion of 
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lending, compared to a setting with frictionless lending, and explains the more muted 
response of investment and output.  
 The two-country variant of the model assumes a global bank: the bank collects 
deposits from local and foreign households, and makes loans to local and foreign 
entrepreneurs. Credit losses in one country trigger a world-wide widening of loan/deposit 
rate spreads, and a world-wide fall in lending and output. The effect on real activity is 
very similar across countries.  
To be added: discussion of related literature. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007); Van den 
Heuvel (2008). Recent quantitative closed economy DSGE models with banks: de 
Walque, Pierrard and Rouabah (2010); Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010); Roeger 
(2009). Value added here: emphasis on transmission of credit loss shock; analytical 
results. Open economy: Devereux, Yetman (2010) assume international investors subject 
to leverage constraint, hard to interpret as banks;  simpler technology (eg no capital 
accumulation) Difference: my paper assumes banks, focus on credit losses, full business 
cycle model 
 
2. The closed economy model 
The closed economy model assumes three (representative) infinitely-lived agents: a 
household, a bank and an entrepreneur. There is a final good that is used for consumption 
(by each of the three agents), and for capital accumulation (by the entrepreneur). All 
agents are price takers.  
 
The household 
The household consumes the final good, provides labor to the entrepreneur and invests 
her savings in bank deposits. Her date t budget constraint is:   
                                                   1
D
t t t t t tC D W N D R   ,                                                (1) 
where tC  and tW  are consumption and the wage rate, respectively (the final good is used 
as numéraire). tN  are hours worked. 1tD   are the bank deposit held by the household, at 
the end of period t. DtR  is the gross interest rate on deposits, between t-1 and t (
D
tR  is set 
at t-1).  
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 The household’s expected life-time utility at date t is:  
                                  10 [ ( ) ( ) }
s D N
t t s t s t ss
E u C u D N

   
  ,                                (2) 
with  , 0;D N    1( ) ( 1) /(1 )u x x     , with 0    is an increasing and concave 
function. The household maximizes (2) subject to the restriction that her period-budget 
constraint holds at t and at all subsequent dates. Ruling out Ponzi schemes, the household 
decision problem has these first-order conditions:                                                     
                                  1 1 1'( )/ '( ) '( )/ '( ) 1
D D
t t t t t tR E u C u C u D u C    ,                                  (3) 
                                                          '( ) Nt tu C W   .                                                       (4) 
 
The bank 
In period t, the bank receives deposits 1tD   and she makes a (one-period) loan 1tL   to the 
entrepreneur. The bank faces a capital requirement: her date t capital 1 1t tL D   should 
not be smaller than a fraction   of assets 1tL  . A capital requirement of this form can 
either represent a legal requirement (Basel II), but it might also result from pressure by 
depositors (to ensure bank solvency).  
 I assume that the bank can hold less capital than the required level, but that this is 
costly (e.g. because the bank then has to engage in creative accounting). Let 
1 1 1( )t t t tx L D L       1 1(1 ) t tL D     denote that bank’s ‘excess’ capital at t. The bank 
bears a cost ( )tx  as a function of ,tx  with (0) 0    and ' 0, '' 0.    Hence, that cost 
is decreasing and strictly convex. When the bank strictly meets its capital requirement, 
then the cost is zero (a positive cost only arises when 0;tx   when 0,tx   then the bank 
receives a benefit). At t, the bank also bears an operating cost 1 1( , )t tD L   that is 
increasing and linear in deposits and loans 1 1,t tD L  . The bank’s period t budget constraint 
is:  
              1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( (1 ) ) (1 )
D B L L
t t t t t t t t t t t tL D R D L L D d L R D                ,         (5) 
where Etd  is the profit (dividend) generated by the bank at t. 
L
tR  is the gross loan interest 
rate between t-1 and t. 0 1Lt   is an exogenous stochastic loan default rate: at t, the 
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entrepreneur only pays back a fraction 1 Lt  of the contracted amount 
L
t tL R . 
L
tR  is set at 
t-1. However, the effective rate of return on the loan, net of default, is only realized at t.  
 The banker does not have access to other assets, and thus she consumes her 
dividends. Her expected life-time utility at t is: 
0
( )s Bt t ssE u d

 .The banker maximizes 
life-time utility subject to current and future budget constraints. Ruling out Ponzi 
schemes, that problem has these first-order conditions: 
                                      1 1 1 ,
''( )/ '( ) 1D B Bt t t t D t tR E u d u d        and                                   (6) 
                                1 1 1 1 ,
'(1 ) '( )/ '( ) 1 (1 )L L B Bt t t t t L t tR E u d u d           ,                         (7) 
where ,D t  and ,L t  are the marginal costs of deposits and loans, respectively and 
1 1
' '((1 ) )t t tL D       .  By accepting more deposits at t, the banker can increase her date 
t consumption, at the cost of a reduction of consumption at t+1. Specifically, when the 
bank raises deposits 1tD   by 1 unit (holding constant loans), then her capital falls by one 
unit, which raises   by ' 0  ; in addition she incurs a marginal operating cost ,D t .  
Hence, the banker’s marginal benefit of deposits (in utility terms) is ,
''( ){1 }.St D t tu d    
The discounted expected marginal cost of deposits to the bank is 1 1 1'( )
D B
t t tR E u d   . At a 
maximum of the bank’s decision problem, the expected marginal benefit equals the 
marginal cost.  If the bank raises loans by one unit at t (holding constant deposits), then 
this lowers her date t dividend by ,
'1 (1 )L t t    . The bank’s effective (gross) real rate 
of return on loans is thus 1 1 ,
'(1 ) /{1 (1 ) }L Lt t L t tR        , which explains the Euler 
equation (7).  
 
The entrepreneur 
The entrepreneur accumulates physical capital, and she uses labor and capital to produce 
the final good. The law of motion of the capital stock is:  
                                                   1 (1 ) ,t t tK K I                                                           (8) 
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where tK  is the capital stock used in production at t; 0 1   is the depreciation rate of 
capital, and tI  is gross investment. Final good output, denoted tY ,  is produced using a 
Cobb-Douglas technology:  
                                                     1( ) ( ) ,t t t tY K N
                                                        (9) 
with 0 1  .  Total factor productivity t  is an exogenous random variable.  
 The entrepreneur’s period t budget constraint is:  
                  11 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
L L E
t t t t t t t t t t t tL R K W N d L K N K
            ,             (10) 
where Etd  is the entrepreneur’s dividend income at t. The entrepreneur consumes her 
dividend income. Her lifetime utility at t is given by 
0
( )s Et t ssE u d

 . Maximization of 
life-time utility subject to (10) yields these first-order conditions:  
                              1 11 1 1 1 1( '( )/ '( )){ 1 } 1
E E
t t t t t tE u d u d K N
             ,                                (11) 
                                          1 1 1 1(1 ) ( '( )/ '( )) 1
L L E E
t t t t tR E u d u d      ,                                     (12) 
                           (1 )t t t tW K N
     .                                                (13)  
  
Market clearing  
Market clearing for the final good requires: 
                      1 1 1 1( , ) ( (1 ) )
B E
t t t t t t t t tY C d d I D L D L            .                         (14) 
 
3. Interest rate spreads and bank capital 
Note that, in contrast to much recent theoretical research on financial frictions (eg 
Kiyotaki and Moore (2007)), the model here assumes that all agents have the same 
subjective discount factor, and that the entrepreneur does not face a collateral constraint. 
In models of the Kiyotaki-Moore type, there are no financial intermediaries; 
entrepreneurs are less patient than households; entrepreneurs face a collateral constraint 
for debt (entrepreneurs’ debt cannot exceed a fraction of their physical capital stock), 
which allows to ensure existence of a stationary equilibrium.  This paper assumes a bank 
that faces a ‘flexible’ type of collateral constrain (it bears a resource cost when deposits 
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fall below a fraction of the bank assets), but the other agents do not face collateral 
constraints—this allows to focus on the effects of the bank capital restriction.   
 As deposits provide liquidity services to households, and as financial 
intermediation is costly, the deposit rate is lower than the loan rate, in the present model. 
Let  1 1 1 1(1 )
L L L
t t t tR R E       be the expected effective gross loan rate (i.e. loan rate, net of 
default). Up to a certainty-equivalent approximation, the bank’s Euler equation (7) 
implies 1 1 1 ,
''( )/ '( ) 1 (1 )L B Bt t t t L t tR E u d u d         . Thus (using (6)),                                   
1 1 , ,
' '/ {1 (1 ) }/{1 },L Dt t L t t D t tR R            and hence:                 
                                 1 1 , , 1 1( (1 ) ) 0'
L D
t t D t L t t tR R L D           .                                (15) 
Holding constant the marginal costs of deposits and loans , ,( , )D t L t  , a rise in excess 
bank capital 1 1(1 )t tL D    lowers thus the (effective) loan/deposit interest rate spread 
1 1
L D
t tR R     (recall that '' 0).    
 Up to a linear approximation, a date t shock to the expected (exogenous) loan 
default rate at t+1, 1
L
t tE   , has no effect on the expected effective loan rate 1
L
tR   observed 
in equilibrium, and hence no effect on consumption, output, loans or deposits; such a 
shock only affects the contractual loan rate 1
L
tR    (e.g. when the expected default rate rises 
by 1 percentage point, the contractual rises by approximately 1%). Only unanticipated 
changes in the default rate affect the real economy. An unanticipated increase in the date t 
default rate, 1 0t t tE    brings about a wealth transfer from the bank to the 
entrepreneur. As shown below, such a transfer can have a sizable effect on output, when 
the bank faces a capital requirement.   
 To provide intuition for this effect, I now analyze in greater detail the optimizing 
behavior of the bank. I do this for the special case where the bank has log utility ( 1) . It 
is straightforward to show that, in that case,  the bank’s date t consumption equals a 
fraction 1   of her beginning-of-period (net) wealth:  
                                            (1 ){ (1 ) }B L L Dt t t t t td L R D R     ;                                    (16) 
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hence, (from the budget constraint (5)), end-of-period wealth plus costs equal a fraction 
  of beginning-of period wealth:   
             1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( (1 ) ) { (1 ) }.
L L D
t t t t t t t t t t tL D D L L D L R D R                  
Up to a linear approximation (around steady state loans and deposits), the left-hand side 
of this expression equals  1 1 1 1(1 (1 ) ') (1 ')
D
t L t D t L tL D L R D R             . As 
1LR    (from the entrepreneur’s Euler equation (12)), we have  
                           21 1 1 { (1 ) }
D L L D
t t t t t t t tA L D R L R D R         ,                                (17) 
Shocks in period t only affect 1tA   and 
B
td  to the extent that beginning-of period wealth 
is affected. Hence, 1tA   and 
B
td  only respond to unanticipated credit losses, but not to 
unanticipated TFP shocks:  
                                    1 1(1 ) ( )
B B L L L
t t t t t t t td E d L R E        .                                 
                                      21 1 1 1( )
L L L
t t t t t t t tA E A L R E         .                                   
An unanticipated credit loss lower 1tA   and 
B
td . The reduction in the banker’s end-or-
period wealth (by a fraction   of the credit loss) is much larger that the reduction in 
consumption (fraction 1   of the loss). To understand why this matters for real activity, 
recall that the loan/ deposit interest rate spread is a decreasing function of excess bank 
capital 1 1(1 ) .t t tx L D     Note that  
                                  1 1(1 ) (1 ) 1( )
D
t t tx A R D        1 1(1 ) .t tA D                                  
The simulations below set 0.1   and show that 1tA   and tx  are highly positively 
correlated in response to credit loss shocks. As an unanticipated credit loss at date t 
lowers the bank’s end-of-period wealth, 1tA  , it triggers a fall in excess bank capital tx , 
which raises the loan/deposit interest rate spread (this result is robust to assuming risk 
aversion different from unity). As pointed out above, the financial friction thus becomes 
more severe when an unanticipated credit loss occurs.  
 An unanticipated TFP shock raises the household’s wage income and thus 
increases her holdings of deposits. On impact, the shock has no effect on the banker’s 
end-of-period wealth, and thus the increase in deposits lowers the bank’s excess capital, 
thus triggering a rise in the loan/deposit interest rate spread, which explains why (as 
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shown below), the presence of the bank dampens the effect of the TFP shock on real 
activity.  
 
4. Calibration 
I consider a baseline calibration with log utility, 1.   The elasticity of output with 
respect to capital is set at 0.3.   One period represents 1 quarter in calendar time. 
Accordingly, I set the depreciation rate of physical capital at 0.025   (a standard value 
used in quarterly models). I set steady state TFP as 1 . 
 I set the required bank capital ratio at 10%   (Basel II requirement: 8%). The 
calibration assumes that the deposit rate and the effective loan rate (net of default) are 2% 
and 4% per annum. The annual loan default rate is set at 3%, so that the loan rate is 
7.12% per annum. (The steady state default rate does not affect real activity.) On a 
quarterly basis, the steady state interest rates are thus: 0.496%dr  , 0.985%Lr   and 
1.757%Lr  , respectively  (where 1,d dr R   1,L Lr R   1).L Lr R     
 I thus set the subjective discount factor at 0.99024   (as 1).LR   The bank’s 
Euler equations (6),(7) imply '1D DR      and   
'1 (1 )L LR       ;  any 
combination of marginal costs , , 'D L    consistent with these conditions generates the 
same first-order dynamics.  I assume that the marginal costs ,D Lt t   are constant across 
time (and equal to steady state values , ).D L    
 I assume that, in steady state, the bank’s excess capital is zero, and that the 
entrepreneur’s debt represents 20% of the physical capital stock (or 43% of annual GDP).  
[Cite empirical evidence.]  The preference parameters ,D N   are set in a manner that 
delivers (1 )L D   and / 0.2L K . 
1
 That calibration implies that, in steady state, the 
                                                 
1
 Namely, I set 0.0106D   and N GDP=2.469/Y .  N  depends on steady state GDP ( )GDPY . For a 
given value of 
N  the model has a unique steady state. N  affects the scale of hours worked, output, 
consumption, capital, investment, deposits and loans. The ratios between these variables and interest rates 
are not affected by 
N . Hence, the choice of N  (or equivalently the choice of steady state GDP) does 
not affect the cyclical properties of interest rates, deposits, loans and real activity. Date t GDP equals the 
sum of the three agent’s consumption plus gross investment. GDP corresponds also to final good output 
minus the bank’s cost t t  .  
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consumptions of the banker and of the entrepreneur represent 0.17% and 6.83% of GDP, 
respectively, and that deposits represent 54% of annual household consumption.  
The simulations below are based on a linearization of the model around a 
deterministic steady state. I thus have to pick a value for the second derivative of the cost 
of excess bank capital (evaluated at the steady state). The baseline calibration assumes 
"(0) 2/ GDPY  . This implies that a reduction in excess bank capital by 1% of quarterly 
steady state GDP ( )GDPY  raises the (quarterly) loan/deposit interest rate spread by 20 
basis points (= 2 0.01 0.002    ), as can be seen from (15).  Equivalently, a rise in excess 
bank capital by 1% of annual GDP raises the interest rate spread by 3.2% per annum 
( 0.002 16).   
 I assume that TFP follows an AR(1) process: 1 ,ln lnt t t      , where ,t  is 
white noise. As is common in the RBC literature (eg King and Rebelo (1999)), I set 
0.95  , 
2
,
2
( ) (0.007) .tE     The default rate likewise follows an AR(1) process: 
1 ,(1 )
L L L
t t t           . I assume 0.95,   
2 2
,( ) (0.01)t tE   . As pointed out above, only 
unanticipated shocks to the default rate matter for real activity. Hence, the variance of 
real activity induced by credit losses only depends on 2,( )t tE   (the persistence of default 
only matters for the behavior of the contractual loan rate LtR , but it is irrelevant for the 
behavior of the expected effective loan rate 1 1 1(1 )
L L
t t t tR R E      and for real activity).   
 
5. Quantitative results 
5.1. Impulse responses 
Table 1 reports dynamic % responses to 1% TFP and credit default innovations (the 
responses of excess bank reserves (x) and of deposits and loans are normalized by steady 
state GDP; the responses of the wage rate, consumption, dividends, investment, hours and 
GDP are normalized by steady state values; interest rate responses are expressed in % per 
annum terms).  
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Results for the baseline model 
Panel (a) of the Table shows responses under the baseline calibration. As in standard 
neoclassical models, a positive TFP shock raises output, consumption, investment and 
employment. As TFP decays gradually after the shock, the household saves more, by 
holding more deposits, and the bank makes more loans. The simulations confirm the 
analytical result (see above) that, on impact, a positive TFP shock lowers the bank’s 
excess capital (x). In fact, the simulation shows that the fall in excess bank capital is 
persistent. Hence, the loans/deposit interest rate spread rises persistently. On impact, a 
1% TFP shock raises the loan rate by 19 basis points (bp), while the deposit rate increases 
by 14 bp.  
 Panel (b) shows that a 1% positive innovation to the loan default rate has a 
sizable, but transient, effect on GDP. On impact GDP falls by 1.30%; GDP 4 quarters 
after the shock rises by 0.10%. Within the first year, annual GDP falls by 0.68%. A 1% 
credit loss corresponds to 0.43% of annual GDP. But the effect on GDP is not very 
persistent: in the second year, annual GDP falls by merely 0.02% (and there after GDP is 
slightly above its level without the shock). According to the IMF’s April 2010 Global 
Financial Stability Report, credit losses of US banks during the current financial crisis 
amount to 6% of US GDP, while credit losses of Euro Area banks amount to 5.3% of EA 
GDP. The model here predicts that a credit loss of this size generates a fall in annual 
GDP of about 5%, in the first year.   
On impact, the supply of loans fall sharply in response to the shock, by 3.05% of 
steady state (quarterly) GDP, which explains the sizable reduction in physical investment 
that drives the fall in GDP.  Deposits fall noticeably less, by -1.31% of steady state GDP.  
As a result, the bank’s excess capital falls (-1.43% of GDP). Interestingly, the expected 
effective loan rate falls in response to the credit loss, -8% bp p.a., but the deposit rate 
falls more strongly, -128 bp. The loan/interest rate spread increases thus by 120 bp. (The 
loan rate that is not corrected for expected default rises by 281 bp).  
 
An economy without bank capital requirement 
Panel (b) of Table 1 reports impulse responses for a model variant in which the bank does 
not face a capital requirement. Specifically, I now assume that the cost function of excess 
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bank capital x is linear in x (i.e. '' 0)  , which implies that the loan/deposit interest rate 
spread is independent of the stocks of deposits and loans.  
 Under this specification, an unanticipated credit loss triggers a permanent 
(constant) rise in the entrepreneur’s consumption and a permanent fall in the bank’s 
dividend. The bank cuts lending, in order to dampen the effect of the default shock on her 
consumption. The credit loss now has no first-order effect on GDP, investment, 
household consumption, deposit and interest rates.  
 The responses to TFP shocks are qualitatively similar to those in the baseline 
structure. However, the short run responses of deposits, loans, investment and output are 
somewhat stronger. For example, GPD rises by 1.87% on impact (compared to 1.63% in 
the baseline model). Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the interest rate spread is 
constant under the alternative specification (in the baseline model, a positive TFP shock 
raises the interest rate spread, which dampens the increase in real activity).  
 
An economy without bank  
Panel (c) of Table 1 considers a model variant in which there is no bank. The household 
now lends directly to the entrepreneur. (In that model variant, I set the weight of deposits 
in the household’s utility function to zero, 0,D   as otherwise no steady state exists, 
given the assumption that the household and the entrepreneur have the same subjective 
discount factor.)  
 In the ‘No Bank’ case, the effects of a TFP on real activity are noticeably 
stronger, in the short run, compared to the baseline structure (e.g. GDP now rises by 
2.03% in response to a 1% TFP shock).  
 A 1% credit loss shock has a very small positive effect on GDP (+0.02%), which 
is due to the fact that the shock lowers the household consumption, which lowers the 
wage rate (see the household’s first-order condition (4)), and raises labor demand.  
 
5.2. Stochastic simulations 
Table 2 reports predicted moments generated by the model (standard deviations of HP 
filtered variables, and their correlation with GDP). The predicted moments confirm the 
analysis above: the presence of a bank with a capital constraint dampens the fluctuations 
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of real activity under TFP shocks, but it generates wider fluctuations in real activity in 
response to default shocks. The predicted standard deviation of GDP [investment] under 
simultaneous TFP and default shocks is 2.03% [9.67%] under the baseline calibration, 
compared to 1.69% [5.91%] in the model variant in which there is no binding bank 
capital constraint ( '' 0).   This suggests that the bank capital requirement has a non-
negligible effect on business cycle behavior.  
Meh and Moran (2010) provide empirical evidence on empirical behavior of the 
ratio of bank capital divided by bank assets, in the US. At a quarterly frequency (1990-
2005), that ratio has a relative standard deviation of 0.43 (compared to the standard of 
GDP); its correlation with GDP and bank loans are -0.23 and -0.70, respectively. (All 
statistics discussed here and below are based on HP filtered series.) In other terms, US 
bank capital, normalized by assets, is counter-cyclical.  
As reported by Roeger (2009), in US quarterly data (1973-2009) the credit spread 
is negatively correlated with GDP, -0.51. Deposits and bank loans to the private non-
financial business sector are positively correlated with GDP (0.08, 0.45).   
 The baseline model here, with TFP and credit loss shocks, matches the volatility 
of the bank capital/bank asset ratio, but the model predicts that that ratio is pro-cylical 
(predicted standard deviation: 0.43; predicted correlation with GDP: 0.64). When there 
are just TFP shocks, the bank capital/assets ratio is not volatile enough, but 
countercyclical. The baseline model predicts a counter-cyclical credit spread (-0.55), and 
procyclical deposits (0.20) and loans (0.37).  
 
 
                                                              Baseline model 
                            All              Just TFP     Just default                                
                                              shocks           shock            shock                   US DATA 
Bank capital/assets                                                                                        
Relative standard dev. 0.43 0.04 0.62 0.34 
Correl. with GDP 0.64 -0.89 0.99 -0.23 
 
Correlations with GDP:                                                                          
Credit spread -0.55 0.89 -0.80 -0.51     
Deposits 0.20 0.38 0.14 0.45  
Loans 0.37 0.34 0.44 0.08  
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6. Two-country version of the model  
I now assume a world with two countries. Both countries produce and consume an 
identical final good that can costlessly be traded internationally. As before, I assume that 
each country is inhabited by a household and by an entrepreneur. There is one global 
bank (that receives deposits in both countries, and channels them to entrepreneurs in both 
countries). The bank acts competitively, and thus the deposit rate and the expected 
effective loan rates are identical across countries. 
2
 The only difference compared to the 
baseline model is that I now assume that the entrepreneur bears a quadratic investment 
adjustment cost. The adjustment cost is calibrated in such a fashion that the model 
generates a realistic relative volatility of investment--in the absence of an investment  
adjustment cost, investment is extremely volatile, when there are country-specific 
technology shocks. (A small adjustment cost is sufficient for that purpose.) 
 Table 3 reports impulse responses to 1% innovations to country 1 TFP and to the 
country 1 loan default rate. The country 1 TFP shock raises country 1 GDP and 
investment (by 1.31% and 3.53%, respectively, on impact), but has basically no effect on 
country 2 GDP and investment.  
By contrast, the 1% country 1 default shock triggers falls in  output and 
investment in both countries; the reductions are very similar across countries; e.g., on 
impact GDP and investment drop by about 0.36% and 1.99%, respectively, in both 
countries. A credit loss lowers the bank’s excess capital, which raises the credit spread in 
both countries; deposits and the deposit rate fall, while consumption rises, in both 
countries. This is accompanied by a rise in the wage rate, and a fall in employment and 
output, in both countries. The effect on (world) GDP is weaker than in the closed 
economy. As mentioned above, a 1% country 1 credit loss corresponds to 0.43% of the 
country’s annual GDP; this triggers a fall or domestic and foreign GDP by    -0.19%, 
during the first year after the shock. Thus, a credit loss of about 5% of annual domestic 
GDP in one country (as observed in the US, during the current crisis), is predicted to 
trigger a reduction of annual GDP by 2.6%, in both countries, during the first year after 
                                                 
2
 All other preference and technology parameters are set at the same values as in the baseline closed 
economy model (the second derivative is set at '' 2/( )world GDP  .  
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the shock.  In the second year after the shock, annual world GDP stays below its pre-
shock level by 0.31. Hence, the effect on GDP is non-negligible, but short-lived.  
 Table 4 reports selected predicted moments generated by the two-country model. 
In a model variant with just credit loss shocks, output and investment are (almost) 
perfectly correlated across countries. With just TFP shocks, the cross-country correlations 
of output and investment are close to zero. With simultaneous default rate and FTP 
shocks, the cross country output correlation are 0.23 and 0.49, respectively.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a DSGE model with a bank. An unanticipated credit loss was 
shown to generate a sizable, but relatively short-lived, recession. With a global bank, a 
loan default shock in one country triggers a fall in both domestic and foreign output.  
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Table 1. Closed economy model: % impulse responses (t periods after shock) 
 
t       x         D         L         Dr         
L
r          
L
r        C          
E
d        
B
d         I         N         W       GDP 
 
(a) BASELINE CALIBRATION WITH BANK 
                                                                 1% TFP shock 
0  -0.06 0.62 0.62 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.73 0.07 0.00 5.10 0.89 0.73 1.63  
1 -0.10 1.19 1.21 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.76 0.12 0.16 4.39 0.73 0.76 1.50  
4 -0.11 2.38 2.52 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.80 0.22 0.84 3.04 0.45 0.80 1.24  
8 -0.08 3.28 3.55 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.77 0.30 1.63 1.99 0.24 0.77 1.01  
40 0.02 2.63 2.94 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.29 0.12 1.80 -0.18 -0.10 0.29 0.18  
 
                                                            1% credit loss shock 
0 -1.43 -1.31 -3.05 -1.28 -0.08 3.81 0.55 0.19 -9.65 -7.81 -1.85 0.55 -1.30 
1 -0.89 -2.53 -3.80 -0.77 -0.02 3.68 0.24 0.18 -7.09 -4.27 -1.00 0.24 -0.75  
4 -0.24 -3.66 -4.33 -0.16 0.04 3.21 -0.10 0.18 -3.81 -0.18 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10  
8 -0.07 -3.46 -3.93 -0.02 0.04 2.63 -0.14 0.22 -2.62 0.66 0.18 -0.14 0.05  
40 -0.01 -1.45 -1.62 -0.01 -0.00 0.50 0.01 0.34 -1.00 0.20 0.06 0.01 0.07  
                                     ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(b) BANK WITHOUT BINDING CAPITAL REQUIREMENT ( '' 0)   
                                                                 1% TFP shock 
0 -0.10 0.87  0.86 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.62 0.08 0.00 6.56 1.24 0.62 1.87  
1 -0.17 1.69 1.69 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.68 0.13 0.05 5.74 1.05 0.68 1.74 
4 -0.33 3.48 3.49 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.78 0.25 0.17 3.78 0.61 0.78 1.40 
8 -0.45 4.68 4.70 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.81 0.32 0.24 2.04 0.24 0.81 1.05 
40 -0.24 2.31 2.30 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.27 0.08 0.00 -0.32 -0.13 0.27 0.13 
 
                                                            1% credit loss shock 
0 -1.57 0.00 -1.75 0.00 0.00 3.89 0.00 0.25 -9.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 -1.57 0.00 -1.75 0.00 0.00 3.70 0.00 0.25 -9.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 -1.57 0.00 -1.75 0.00 0.00 3.17 0.00 0.25 -9.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 -1.57 0.00 -1.75 0.00 0.00 2.58 0.00 0.25 -9.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
40 -1.57 0.00 -1.75 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 -9.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
                                     ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(c) NO BANK (DIRECT HOUSEHOLD LENDING TO ENTREPRENEUR) 
                                                                 1% TFP shock 
0 --- 1.02  1.02 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.58 0.09 --- 7.56 1.47 0.58 2.03  
1 --- 2.03 2.03 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.61 0.15 --- 6.81 1.30 0.61 1.91 
4 --- 4.40 4.40 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.74 0.27 --- 4.91 0.86 0.74 1.60 
8 --- 6.35 6.35 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.81 0.35 --- 3.07 0.45 0.81 1.27 
40 --- 5.77 5.77 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.37 -0.10 --- -0.35 -0.19 0.37 0.18 
 
                                                            1% credit loss shock 
0 --- -1.72 -1.72 0.00 0.00 3.89 -0.01 0.25 --- 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
1 --- -1.71 -1.72 0.00 0.00 3.70 -0.01 0.25 --- 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
4 --- -1.69 -1.69 0.00 0.00 3.17 -0.01 0.25 --- 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
8 --- -1.67 -1.67 0.00 0.00 2.58 -0.01 0.25 --- 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
40 --- -1.62 -1.62 0.00 0.00 0.50 -0.00 0.26 --- 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.02  
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Notes: The Table shows % responses to 1% TFP and credit loss shocks  (after t=0,1,4,8,40 quarters). 
Responses of excess bank capital (x), deposits (D) and loans (L) are normalized by steady state GDP 
(responses of deposits and loans pertain to end-of-period stocks). Responses of household consumption (C), 
entrepreneur’s dividend ( ),Ed  bank dividend ( ),Bd   investment (I), hours worked (N), the wager rate (W) 
and GDP are normalized by steady state values. Deposit rate ( ),Dr  expected effective loan rate net of 
default ( ),Lr and loan rate before default ( )Lr  are expressed in % per annum terms.  
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Table 2. Closed economy model: predicted moments  (HP filtered) 
            TFP & default shock        Just TFP shock         Just default shock             
                  % Std.    CorrY          % Std.     CorrY         % Std.      CorrY                 
(a) BASELINE CALIBRATION WITH BANK 
 x        1.54 0.64 0.11 -0.89 1.54 0.99   
D 4.69 0.20          1.82 0.38 4.32 0.14    
L          5.81 0.37 1.95 0.34 5.47 0.44    
D
r          1.39 0.74 0.11 0.75 1.38 0.99  
L
r           0.20 0.89 0.17 0.96 0.11 0.81   
L
r         5.06 -0.46 0.17 0.96 5.05 -0.70  
C           0.97 0.06 0.72 0.96 0.65 -0.95   
E
d         0.27 -0.14 0.17 0.44 0.21 -0.63   
B
d          10.52 0.64 0.98 -0.17 10.47 0.93   
I 9.67        0.94 4.41 0.98 8.60 0.99   
GDP 2.03 1.00 1.44 1.00 1.42 1.00   
                                     ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(b) BANK WITHOUT BINDING CAPITAL REQUIREMENT ( '' 0)   
x   2.05 -0.05 0.27 -0.38 2.03  ---         
D 2.84 0.36 2.84 0.36 0.00 ---  
L     3.64 0.28 2.85 0.36 2.25 ---       
D
r   0.20 0.95 0.20 0.95 0.00 ---         
L
r   0.20 0.95 0.20 0.95 0.00 ---    
L
r  5.03 0.03 0.20 0.95 5.07 ---         
C           0.66 0.89 0.66 0.89 0.00 ---    
E
d         0.38 0.24 0.20 0.47 0.32 ---    
B
d  12.47 0.02 0.16 0.15 12.47 ---           
I 5.91 0.98 5.91 0.98 0.00 ---    
GDP 1.69 1.00 1.69 1.00 0.00 --- 
                                     ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(c) NO BANK (DIRECT HOUSEHOLD LENDING TO ENTREPRENEUR) 
x   --- --- --- --- --- ---    
D --- --- --- --- --- ---     
L     4.14 0.25 3.49 0.31 2.22 -1.00         
D
r   --- --- --- --- --- ---            
L
r   0.22 0.94 0.22 0.94 0.00 0.97     
L
r  5.08 0.05 0.22 0.94 5.08 0.97         
C           0.60 0.88 0.60 0.88 0.01 -0.97    
E
d         0.40 0.29 0.23 0.49 0.32 1.00    
B
d  --- --- --- --- --- ---    
I 6.88 0.98 6.88 0.98 0.09 0.98    
GDP 1.85 1.00 1.85 1.00 0.03 1.00 
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Notes: The Table shows predicted model statistics. % Std: standard deviation in %. CorrY: correlation with 
GDP. Statistics for bank capital (x), deposits (D) and loans (L) pertain to series that were normalized by 
steady state GDP (responses of deposits and loans pertain to end-of-period stocks). Statistics for household 
consumption (C), entrepreneur’s dividend ( ),Ed  bank dividend ( ),Bd   investment (I), hours worked (N), the 
wager rate (W) and GDP  pertain to series that were expressed as relative deviations from steady state 
values. Deposit rate ( ),Dr  expected effective loan rate net of default ( ),Lr and loan rate before default ( )Lr  are 
expressed in % per annum terms. % Std: standard deviation (in %);   CorrY: correlation with GDP.  
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Table 3. Two-country model: % impulse responses (t periods after shock)  
 
t       x          Dr         
L
r  ||   D1       L1        C1        I1   GDP1  ||  D2       L2       C2        I2   GDP2         
 
(a) BASELINE CALIBRATION 
                                                         1% shock to country 1 TFP 
0  -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.53 0.30 0.77 3.35 1.31 -0.18 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.05 
1 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 1.01 0.54 0.76 2.97 1.23 -0.37 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.06           
4     -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 2.17 1.01 0.74 2.08 1.02 -0.87 0.35 0.06 0.20 0.09  
 
                                                       1% credit loss shock in country 1 
0 -0.75 -0.31 4.21 -0.34 -2.09 0.14 -1.99 -0.37 -0.35 -0.34 0.15 -1.99 -0.35 
1 -0.48 -0.20 3.99 -0.67 -2.16 0.07 -1.19 -0.20 -0.67 -0.41 0.07 -1.19 -0.22  
4 -0.13 -0.05 3.23 -1.04 -2.18 -0.02 -0.15 -0.04 -1.04 -0.43 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05  
Note: Di, Li, Ci, Ii, GDPi: deposits, loans, household consumption, investment and GDP in country I (i=1,2)  
 
 
 
Table 4. Two country model: predicted moments  (HP filtered) 
              TFP & default shock    Just TFP shock          Just default shock             
               % Std.    Corr1&2      % Std.   Corr1&2      % Std.   Corr1&2 
(a) BASELINE CALIBRATION WITH BANK 
D 2.54 0.04 1.89 -0.72 1.69 1.00   
L 3.12 0.38 1.01 0.10 2.95 0.41   
I          4.38 0.49 3.04 -0.05 3.15 1.00  
GDP 1.30 0.23 1.18 0.07 0.54 0.99     
Note: %Std: standard deviation (in %), Corr1&2: cross-country correlation  
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